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The present disastrous situation in Darfur is the 
outcome of a complex web of underdevelopment, 
ecological, political, social, and security factors… 
(Hamad, Z.M. Mohammed [n.d].) 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
   The civil war in the Sudan’s Darfur region has been 
on the world’s agenda for quite sometime now. But the 
solutions to the conflict are far from sight due to the 
multiplicity of actors and multiple competing interests that 
are involve. Compounding the volatile military-political 
situation and its accompanied complex emergencies is that 
the responses of the international community have been 
vague and not encourage enough. Additionally, Darfur is not 
assisted by the “rushed and ungrounded suggestions on how 
to best support on-going work for peace and how to reach 
long lasting political solutions” (Norberg and Brune, 2007: 
5). The Darfurian crisis, opposing the Government of the 
Sudan (GoS) and its proxy militia force (the Janjaweed) on 
the one hand, and the different regional rebel movements 
championed by the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army 
(SLM/A), and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on 
another hand1, has resulted in the stupendous loss of lives 
and property. Between February 2003 when the war started 
and 2009, the conflict had produced hundreds of thousands 
of deaths, more than 2 million displaced (Liegeois, 2009), 
while mass raping, gangsterism, etc, are now the ‘normal’ 
ways of life in this ‘highly unfortunate’ region. 
                                                
1
 Presently there are more than 30 rebel movements in Darfur. 
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Certainly, scholars have provided us with different 
versions of the conflict’s etiology. While a large number of 
interesting studies blame the conflict on racial factor, i.e. 
conflict between ‘the Arabs’ and ‘the Black Africans’, others 
see it from the prismatic lenses of ecology, i.e. the 
competitions for scarce natural productive resources of 
pasture and water for agricultural and other vital economic 
purposes as the pivotal factor that trigger the current 
conflict. Instead, I transcend these dominant views and 
solicit for alternative explanations for a better understanding 
of this Darfurian challenge. What is striking is that the crisis 
can be analysed at three levels, viz, (1) conflict between GoS 
and the Darfur region over the sharing of national wealth 
and power; (2) conflict occasioned by tribal rivalries 
championed by tribal elite; and, finally (3) conflict between 
the identity groups, i.e. between the African farmers and 
Arab pastoralists. Unquestionably, these three types of 
conflicts have the same root: the issue marginalisation (both 
historical and contemporary) or what Mohamed (2007) refers 
to as ‘relative underdevelopment’ that has badly affected 
every facet of Darfur’s life; which in turn can be traced to 
governance crisis occasioned by the lopsided policies of 
Khartoum and its riverine-dominated Arab elite; thereby 
reinforcing Hamad’s argument as stated in the epigraphy 
above. Understandably, the ‘unjust’ policies of Khartoum are 
unsurprising since these were inherited from the British 
colonial administration that placed the Arabs above African 
ethnic groups. From the preceding, this article probes the 
underlying causes of the conflict using a diachronic 
approach and explains how the issue of marginalisation of 
the region triggers the types of conflicts identified above, 
and, finally proffers some useful policy suggestions that 
might assist in halting the festering conflict trajectory, and 
ameliorating the current tragic situations in Darfur in 
particular and the Sudan in general. The theoretical 
frameworks favoured by this study are, therefore, 
Frustration-Aggression theory and neopatrimonialism in 
order to have a proper understanding of the crisis. 
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2. Theorectical Framework of Analysis 
 
   My objective here is to discuss the interface between the 
issue of marginalisation and Darfur conflict within the broad 
contexts of conceptual and theoretical postulations. The 
focus is, therefore, to probe how the perpetual 
impoverishment of ethnic groups by a neopatrimonial state, 
with all its fissiparous traits, triggers responses/reactions 
that can be at the perils of such state. I seek to situate this 
discourse within the framework of the Frustration—
Aggression theory as advanced by Dollard, et al (1939). Its 
basic argument, rigorously elaborated by Davies (1962: 5-
19), is that relative deprivation occurs when expected need 
satisfaction increases linearly overtime, whereas the actual 
need satisfaction levels off after sometime. This scenario is, 
undoubtedly, bound to be resulted into an increasing gap 
between the expected and the actual, which definitely causes 
frustration and mobilizes such frustrated people to engage in 
violence (Ellingsen, 2000: 230). Drawing on a wide range of 
data war sets, Ted Gurr (1970) argues that the motivation of 
people to involve in violence is conditioned by the deprivation 
experience when the expected needs are not in sight; 
implying that relative deprivation is a necessary precondition 
for conflict. The insight from this theory can be put thus: the 
higher the people have perceived deprivation in relations to 
their expectations, the greater their dissatisfactions, the 
more tension among members of a society, the likelihood of 
civil strife is severe. The Frustration-Aggression theoreticians 
argued that the theory is based on three fundamental 
assumptions: First, that aggression is a function of 
frustration and frustration mostly results in aggression. 
Second, frustration is an interference with the occurrence of 
an instigate goal response at its proper time. Third, the 
theory pattern is culture bound because aggressive impulses 
and group/individual targets are determined and shaped by 
different cultural systems. Thus, social system is obliged to 
finding appropriate mechanism(s) locate and manage 
sources of frustration and also for aggression. 
How, then, can the state be the architect of people’s 
frustration that leads to aggression? This can be explained 
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within the context of the neopatrimonial character of the 
African states. Then, how does the theory of 
neopatrimonialism assist us in explaining the conflict under 
focus? Neopatrimonialism, a variant of Max Weber’s 
patrimonialism is, according to Médard (1991: 323), a hybrid 
setting within which patrimonial logic combines with other 
modern logics. In a neopatrimonial state, there is an 
intentionally erosion of the dichotomy between the public 
and private domains in governance and state administration; 
including, of course, between public and private norms with 
fatal consequences for the state and its people. The theory 
unmasks the centrality of political power since access to the 
state permits its privatisation and patrimonialisation. Thus, 
African leaders see politics as a means to wealth and 
consequently the redistribution of the state resources to 
ethnic and/or tribesmen, political gladiators, etc, become 
germane to reinforcing their hold on power, thereby 
enhancing further primitive accumulation. Thus, it is 
generally undeniably clear that the state executives see and 
consider these as points for the exaction of prebendes. In a 
neopatrimonial state, democratic principles in governance 
are often long-forgotten, while democratic space is 
constricting daily, not forgetting that financial probity and 
transparency remain aliens. Both economic and politics fail 
to operate according to the logic of free choice. The 
neopatrimonial state is authoritarian and violence-prone. 
Certainly, the level of patrimonialism in each state is 
conditioned on the amount of resources available to political 
leaders for pillage and distribution (Bratton and van den 
Walle, 1994). In a neopatrimonial state, the economy is in 
the firm grip of the state executives and since politics seems 
to be the basis of managing economic activities, it is bound 
to be inefficient and unaccountable. Economic crisis 
becomes its indelible mark which, by extension, transformed 
into political chaos as the state and society are at daggers 
drawn position for the control of the constricted space 
These theoretical conjectures are apt and convincingly 
beneficial in our search for understanding the Darfur crisis, 
for the neopatrimonial and rentier characters of the 
Sudanese state (even in the pre-independence Sudan) 
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culminated in the unequal distribution of the fruits of growth 
to the detriment of Darfur, lead to underdevelopment and 
eventually compelling the marginalised people to violence 
resisting Khartoum’s policies and at another level, inducing 
conflicts among different ethnic groups competing for the 
limited ‘available underdeveloped’ resources. Thus, the failed 
expectations of Darfurians in a neopatrimonial Sudan 
resulted in frustration that eventually lead to aggression in 
term of war. 
 
3. Mapping Darfur: Geographical, Sociological and 
Historical Contexts 
 
    Darfur is a region found in the western part of the 
Republic of the Sudan (RoS) and lies between latitude 10o—
16o N and longitude 22o —27o 30’E. Darfur has an average 
area of 160,000 square miles, and is topographically diverse 
with high desert in the north flows into lush grassland in the 
south. The troubled region, with a population of 7 million, 
became part of the larger Anglo-Egyptian Sudan with the 
assassination of its last Fur Sultan, Ali Dinar, by the British 
forces on 6 November 1916. Geographically, in spite of the 
signing of the border agreement between London and Paris, 
in January 1924, the official border delimitations between 
Darfur and the French Equatorial Africa (i.e. present day 
Chad and Central African Republic) did not materialise until 
1938. Consequently, a significant number of ethnic groups 
along the border area were divided into two by international 
borders with consequences that are central to the 
relationships among the post-colonial states. 
To really understand what is actually unfolding in 
Darfur, we need to step back into history. Darfur had a long 
history of being a traditional Sudanese Kingdom with multi-
ethnic composition of which the Keira constitute its ethnic 
core. Originated in the mid-17th century (c. 1650), people 
began to converge around Jebel Marra tableland that 
heralded the emergence of a state-like structure of a 
centralised polity. Also established more than a century 
earlier (precisely in 1504) was the Funj Kingdom that 
occupied the Nile valley area. In spite of the fact that both 
Kingdoms espoused Islamic ideology, they were not only 
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autonomous, but also antagonistic to each another. This 
situation led to numerous military activities and the quest 
for invasion by one against the other with negative 
consequences of vitiating the usefulness of extending the 
nationalist interpretation of those antecedents of the RoS. 
Both Kingdoms espoused the ideology of an Islamicised state 
while the ruling families of both Kingdoms laid claim to Arab 
ancestry. The implication of this claim is that it placed the 
royal families outside, as well as over and above the multiple 
indigenous tribal/ethnic groups over whom they reigned. 
For, the claim of Arabic descent made the royal families close 
to Muhammed, the Prophet of Islam. The Funj and Fur 
royalties claimed Ummayyad Arab and Hilali Arab roots 
respectively. 
The claim of Arab ancestry of the ruling families 
appears to be unfounded going by their physical 
appearances since they are all dark-skinned Sudanese. 
Thus, affinal ties constituted a vital force that integrated 
different ethnic groups and helped tremendously in 
expanding the frontier of the Fur Sultanate from the Jebel 
Marra massive. This is because the Fur Sultans married 
their daughters to various ethnic/tribal chiefs; making 
princesses to cross ethnic frontiers in marriages, thus 
cemented relations with the rulers and predatory-expansion 
by military forces. These affinal ties placed the Fur Sultans 
in a very high position, and empowered them to incorporate 
other ethnic formations into their fold as tributaries. It 
should be recalled that the first Fur Sultan, Sulayman 
Solong, was a product of affinal tie of an Arab father and a 
Fur princess. Overall, during the initial phase, Fur Sultanate 
was ‘relatively’ peaceful.  
The fairly stable atmosphere served as a launching 
pad for the Sultanate’s incorporation of smaller and 
sedentary tribal groups into its fold1; and by extension the 
Sultan was responsible for guaranteeing the state security. It 
appears that the kind of social contract between the leaders 
and the followers in the Fur Sultanate at the epoch was not 
                                                
1
 The sedentary groups were the Berti, Daju, Dadinga, Tunjur, Mima, Marareet, and the 
migrant religious men from West Africa 
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total because the level of submission to the Sultans was 
seemingly varied. This is because the nomadic groups were 
less controlled by the state; a situation that saw frequently 
armed contests between the state and these groups in the 
former’s quest to subjugate the latter. Furthermore, the 
picture painted above does not suggest that affinal ties were 
not extended to the leaders of nomadic groups where 
sometime they were also wheedled to act as tributaries for 
the Sultans. 
The Fur Sultanate political system can be described as 
consociational (read: Lijphart, 1977) because at the apex of 
the power pyramid was the Sultan who imposed laws that 
were expected to be obeyed throughout his jurisdiction. 
Though, these orders were imposed in collaboration with the 
leaders of the constituent ethnic groups who acted as their 
tributaries. Additionally, the Sultans were duty bound to act 
as arbiters in any dispute that might ensue and also 
allocated land rights to different and numerous 
territorialised ethnic groups through their elite that were 
equally lured into affinal ties through intermarriages. Thus, 
the “nature of legitimacy which informed the position of the 
royal elite had a religion and divine character...” Since the 
Sultanate was dichotomised along the lines of ethnicity, 
tribe, language, etc, religion served as a web that unified it, 
while the Sultans were recognised as Divine rulers. 
Therefore, the society was maintained by a kingship 
obligation as well as the acceptance of Allah’s will.  
Thus, the region’s territorialised ethnic structure is 
central to fathom the inter-ethnic/intra-tribal relations and 
competitions in contemporary Darfur. This is because its 
spatial distribution was characterised by segmental 
cleavages 1  of tribes, linguistics etc, in which most of the 
groups have a traditional dar (i.e. homeland) that bears their 
names, determine their production systems, and which in 
spite of the regular contacts with other tribal/ethnic groups, 
socially reproduce themselves autonomous of others. In this 
context, the ethnic Fur occupies the central Darfur with 
other small groups that engage in farming. To the south of 
the Fur, we have the Baggara Arabs and other groups that 
are cattle breeders, while the nomadic camel breeding Arab 
                                                
1
 On the concept of Segmental Cleavages, see Eckstein, 1966. 
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groups occupy north Darfur. These production systems are 
not watertight since they are not restricted and in most 
cases are typified as agro-pastoral. The presence of 
homeland as a separate territorial entity with its own 
language, independent political system, etc did absolutely 
nothing to prevent constant interactions among these 
groups. Since the search for pasture and water sources 
induced considerable movements that encourage intra-tribal 
contacts that always resulted into conflictual relations as 
competition over these resources became intense. The search 
for scare resources still have much impacts on the 
sociological configurations and the relations among ethnic 
and tribal groups as it flare up multiple and destructive 
ethnic/tribal conflicts as the Arab/Fur conflicts of the mid-
1980s remind us. 
 
 
4. Marginalisation of Darfur: The Genesis 
 
The incorporation of Darfur into the emerging 
Sudanese state is pivotal to our understanding of the 
region’s marginalisation history and all its consequences. 
The formative periods of incorporation are: The Turco-
Egyptian rule (1821-1885); the Mahdist State (1885-1898); 
and the Anglo-Egyptian Colonial/Condominium period 
(1898-1956) of which the first period terminated the 
indigenous state formation. 
 
4.1 The Turco-Egyptian Rule (1821-1885)   
The Fur Sultanate was eclipsed by the Turco-Egyptian 
colonial rule in 1873. The Funj Kingdom was earlier 
conquered by the same power in 1821. Thus, these incidents 
brought the two kingdoms under foreign occupation and 
altered the existing consociational political systems, while 
the boundaries between the two Kingdoms collapsed. Under 
this rule, the use of force became its hallmarks, while the 
indigenous people were subjected to exploitation, and any 
challenge to the established ‘exploitative’ order was 
ruthlessly dealt with. Also most parts of southern Sudan 
were incorporated into the evolving Sudanese state 
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headquartered in Khartoum. Harir (1994: 30) aptly captures 
the impacts of the unfolding scenario on Darfur and post-
independence Sudan, thus: “The movement of power seat to 
Khartoum from Darfur and Sennar in the peripheries had 
major consequences for the political development of the 
Sudan as this meant the strengthening of the position of 
central riverine Sudan at the expense of the peripheries. 
Likewise, is the inclusion of the southern parts of the 
country which became a reserve for slave raids.” (Italics 
added)  While the two Kingdoms lost their autonomies, the 
northern Sudanese ethnic groups (especially those from the 
Nile valley area—Jaaliyyin, Shaiqiyya, and Nubians) were 
favoured by the colonial authorities in gaining entry into the 
state’s institutions at the perils of other ethnic formations. 
 
4.2 The Mahdist State/Mahdiya (1885-1898) 
The Turco-Egyptian rule reached its crescendo and 
later descended into ignominy with its defeat by the Mahdist 
Army in 1885. The Mahdist state (or the Mahdiya) was 
founded by Mohammed Ahmed Ibn Abdallah—known as the 
“Mahdi” meaning the “guided one” sent by God to redeem 
and unite the devout Muslims and purify Islam1. The Mahdi 
led the indigenous revolt with massive supports of the 
western Sudanese tribal groups against the oppressive 
foreign rule. The imperative of this period in the evolving 
Sudanese state “lies, perhaps, not in his call for an Islamic 
state but rather in the ability of the charismatic leader to 
exploit the conditions of discontent precipitated by the 
colonial Turco-Egyptian rule and unify the peripheral 
Sudanese to conquer the seat of central politics power in 
Khartoum” (Harir, 1994: 31). Central to the revolution was 
the imposition of Islamic theocracy in the Sudan propelled 
by the concept of Jihad and the purification of Islam. Despite 
the place of Islam in the Mahdist state, the revolution was 
well supported by Muslims and people of non-Islamic faiths 
for varied reasons. No sooner had the colonial rule 
terminated and the death of the Sudan’s British Governor, 
General Gordon, in the Battle of Khartoum in 1885 than the 
Great Mahdi himself died, while the state’s leadership fell on 
                                                
1 See Deng, 1994; Woodward, 1979; Holt, 1970; and Theobald, 1965 for detailed 
historical account of the Great Mahdi, a Dongolawi by tribe. 
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Khalifa (meaning: Successor) Abdullahi Ibn Mohammed—a 
Taaisha Baggara Arab from western Sudan.  
 Not too long afterwards, conflict based on ethnicity 
ensued between the new leader Abdullahi and Khalifa Sharif 
who was the cousin of the Mahdi. For, Abdullahi’s 
background, though Arab, was considered as a stranger to 
their counterpart of the riverine extraction as against the 
Khalifa Sharif’s group that was regarded as the Awlad al 
Balad (Arabic, “sons of the soil”)1. With the assistance of his 
Baggara Arab fellows, Abdullahi was able to crush Sharif’s 
rebellion, thereby, became the state’s absolute ruler. He, 
therefore, followed the path of authoritarianism, as personal 
rule became the norm, while the Baggara tribal hegemony 
flourished. Abdullahi encouraged the massive migration of 
his tribesmen to the Mahdist capital, Omdurman, while 
those that opposed the idea were coerced to do so. Thus, it is 
argued that “in as much as the massive movement of ethnic 
groups from the peripheries because of political mobilisation 
by the centre of Mahdist power was the modality, the 
Sudanese state at this stage was not only strongly 
centralised in terms of state ideology, but it is also showed 
clear tendencies of creating an ethnic core as a vehicle for 
state formation.” Abdullahi later, he “instituted regular 
administration, appointing Ansars (who were usually 
Baggara tribes) as Emirs over each of several provinces, but 
his authority in the Mahdiya remained absolute” (Deng, 
                                                
 
1Again Harir’s (1994: 31) captivating analysis of this hot issue worth citing in extensio. 
He argues that: 
Awlad al Balad is an Arabic term which means the legitimate sons of the land. It 
has been used historically to refer to Sudanese of Arabic stock from the Nile 
valley. It prevails even today except for the fact that another term has been 
added to it so that it can assume more precision of connotation: Wad Arab or 
Awlad Arab, the sons of Arabs. In the Mahdist context, although the Khalifa was 
the leader of the Mahdist state as the legitimate successor to the Mahdi, his 
Taaisha background puts him beyond the connotative boundaries of Awlad al 
Balad. Khalifa Sharif who was the cousin of the late Mahdi was a riverine 
Mahdist, and by definition Wad Balad. Thus, this term, in some sense, 
demarcates ethnic boundaries between the riverine Sudanese and the rest... The 
assumed superiority of the Awlad al Balad, i.e. riverine Sudanese, is taken as a 
matter of course. See also Kalid, 1990. 
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1994: 161). What is fundamental here is that the conflict 
between the two leaders was rooted in the claim of who was 
entitled to rule. As Awlad al Balad, the riverine Arabs 
considered as their birthright to decide for the state, while 
the people from the peripheries, including Darfur, were 
regarded as followers. This aspect of politics is not yet 
resolved in contemporary Sudan. 
 Thus, this internal political wrangling, personality 
clash between the two Khalifas, famines occasioned by the 
exodus of the western Baggara tribesmen to Omdurman as 
Mahdist soldiers, and the expansionist/over ambition of the 
Mahdiya in exporting Islamic theocracy to the outside world 
served as its Achilles heel. With the death of Abdullahi 
during the battle of Um Diwaykarat in Kordofan, the Mahdist 
state was defeated and the Sudan was ‘re-conquered’ by the 
Anglo-Egyptian forces in 1898. 
 
 
4. 3 The Anglo-Egyptian Colonial (Condominium) 
Rule (1898-1956) 
With the fall of the Mahdist state, the Sudan was 
placed under the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium rule.1  The 
state was later embroiled in strong resistance to foreign 
occupation for more than three decades. Darfur Sultanate 
that was restored following the defeat of the Mahdist forces 
by Ali Dinar was forcefully conquered in 1916 and 
incorporated into the emerging Sudanese state on 1 January 
1917. The Condominium rule became the foundation of 
modern Sudan with all the attributes of a modern statehood. 
Thus, the post-Mahdist state, though under foreign 
occupation, could be considered as a positive development in 
some aspects, especially with defining the territorial cum 
political entity named the Sudan. 
 The country was polarised into North-South dichotomy 
of Arabs and Africans respectively and was administered as 
such. The claims of some scholars that belong to the 
Modernisation School that the British colonial policies in 
Africa were to modernise the traditional societies appear not 
                                                
 
1
 The Condominium was an international agreement between Britain and Egypt for the 
administration of the Sudan. The Agreement was signed in Egypt on 19 January 1899. 
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too well reconciled with the reality in the Sudan. Though the 
British regarded themselves as agent of modernisation, by 
civilising the Sudan through the complete transformation of 
its traditional society into a modern one by laying the solid 
foundation for socio—economic developments, etc. This 
assertion cannot be admitted wholeheartedly in the Sudan’s 
case, for during this period; the existing segmental cleavages 
were deepened and reinforced by the lopsided colonial policy 
of divide and rule, which favoured the North. This is 
unsurprising because the ideology that shaped British 
colonial governance was Victorian. In the Victorian 
worldview, Islam is a civilisation but lower in status to 
Christianity and Western civilisation. Paganism was 
presumably lower in status than both. Thus, the British 
declared the South as de facto Protectorate and treated the 
region that was populated by people of non-Islamic faith as 
‘unprotected’ because they, presumably, had no civilisation 
in the first place to protect like the Muslims. Consequently, 
the pagans/animists need to be ‘protected and civilised’ and 
were exposed to western education through Christian 
missionaries that were also preoccupied with the wider task 
of converting the Pagans to Christianity. Policies that 
encouraged separate development were promoted. The South 
was further separated from the rest of the country by the 
promulgation of the Close District Ordinance in 1922 that 
outlawed ‘foreigners’ from other parts of the country from 
entering the South (Collins, 1962; Nalder, 1935; Beshir, 
1967). 
 In the northern Sudan, the Condominium rule/power 
was very much preoccupied with, and sincerely devoted 
resources, and time to its socio-economic developments. This 
policy was rejected by the southerners. With this goal in 
mind, the North witnessed a meteoric rise in development 
projects such as the introduction of western education to 
create semi-skilled Sudanese of northern extraction to 
occupy the lower echelon in the colonial administration and 
to produce local submamurs to replace the Egyptians; the 
proliferation of such agricultural schemes as the Gezira 
Cotton Irrigation Scheme and the construction of Sennar 
Dam. The colonial policy, unsurprisingly, bore fruits with the 
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emergence of, in less than twenty years, a class of elite of 
northern origin who were absorbed into the Government 
Services and were later to dominate the Sudan’s socio-
economic and political life. The class of elite, known as the 
Effendiyah, dominated Sudan’s politics and led the country 
to a negotiated independence in 1956. Thus, the policy was 
costly because “by the time the Southern policy was reversed 
in favour of integration with the northern part in 1947, 
major structural inequalities were already visible. Not least, 
among them and with major political consequences for the 
independent Sudan was the development of two parallel 
elites in the country: a Christanised missionary educated 
elite in the South and a formally educated riverine elite in 
the North. The latter was to inherit the colonial state at 
independence and the former was to be marginalised from 
access to the state and was to armed struggle” (Harir, 1994: 
33).  
 It is apparent that the colonial state was tyrannical, 
maintained its authority by force and favoured the North. 
This scenario would make one to, prima facie, contemplate 
that the Arabs were better off compared to their southern 
counterparts. Superficially, this may be true but we need to 
look beyond what was unfolding at that time along the Arab-
occupied North and the South regions fault-line to ascertain 
what the situation within the North itself looked like. In this 
respect, Darfur presents a better case because of its 
sociological configurations that encompasses a large number 
of Arabs of different tribes.1 After Darfur was annexed it was, 
for more than three decades, a neglected outpost of empire. 
This is simply because the British neither have any concrete 
policy nor plan for the region but concerned more about its 
strategic position because the region was also targeted by 
the French who were in control of neighbouring Chad. As 
part of this neglect, like the South, a native administration 
was established with the local tribal chiefs that were 
empowered in order to maintain low number of British 
nationals in Darfur. The British administration started a 
transformation of the Sudanese tribal communities, altering 
the existing political systems and structures based on 
                                                
 
1
 It is often argued that there are 27 different Arab tribes in Darfur. 
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flexible kingship, thereby creating the prevailing political 
reality of today. By the time the RoS gained its 
independence, the polarisation of the society along 
North/South divide, and other cleavages had completely 
deepened and gave rise to hierarchical classification 
patterned along tribal/ethnic lines which gave more worth to 
certain ethnic group over others, using various 
anthropological arguments that are based on racial 
prejudices to portray the virtues of the Arabs of the Nile 
valley vis-à-vis the vices of others. This polarisation has 
lifelong effects on the Sudan’s socio-economic and political 
developments. 
On the political front, politics became elite 
(Northerners and riverine) game and luxury to the South 
(African ethnic groups) reinforced by Islam and Arabism as 
its cultural vehicle. The political worldview of the northern 
elite became the “Sudanese”, while Sudanese nationalism 
equaled Arab viewpoint. Thus, the term “Sudanese” equaled 
“riverine” and it was reinforced by such pejorative and value 
loaded terms such as Awlad Al Balad versus Janubi 
(Southerner), and Gharbawi (Westerner), and Awlad Arab 
versus Abid (Slaves), or Nubawi (Nuba) they serve to enhance 
the worth of some groups and denying the human worth of 
others. At the extreme, the riverine Arabs classified different 
ethnic groups into five main identity groups based on their 
perception in order to manipulate the political space. The 
main groups, according to Harir (1994: 37), are:  
 
“(a) The dominant group under the rubric of Awlad Arab 
(Northern riverine Sudanese including Nubians)1, 
(b) Gharaba (or Fellata or Tarkana) which included all the 
groups that stemmed from the West, the boundary of 
which started beyond the White Nile; 
(c) Hadendowa which is shorthand for all groups 
belonging to the Beja conglomerate; 
(d) Nuba, and; 
                                                
 
1
  The Awlad Arab included some groups of non-Arab Nubian extraction, like the Mahas, 
Dagla, Kunuz—See Harir, 1981. 
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(e) Janubiyyin which included all the southern groups 
irrespective of whether they were Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic, 
or Sudanic.” 
 
Space will not permit detailed discussions here, but 
what is striking is that this hierarchical classification of the 
groups lumped together made it easy to accord the Awlad Al 
Balad (that are at the zenith of the ethnic pyramid) more 
worth than the other groups that are generally classified as 
Zurga (black) and Abid. These prejudices denied the Sudan 
the opportunity of having a united plural society as they 
determine the share of political power, economic resources 
that are favourable to the riverine Arabs. 
 
 This perception, rooted in the idiosyncrasies and 
psychological mindset of the riverine Arab elite, justified by 
anthropological arguments (real or manufactured) and 
propelled by the ‘cultural core’ of Arabism explains the 
lopsided development between Khartoum and the peripheral 
areas. While the Gezira triangle in the North became the 
bastion of development, the West, East, and South 
populations became on lookers and trailed behind in term of 
socio-economic developments. The marginalised 
ethnic/tribal groups served as followers of political parties 
under the leadership of the riverine Arabs. In this case, 
Darfur follows the narrow path that leads to a market where 
all the traded commodities are generally referred to as 
“underdevelopment.” 
 
 
 
5. Distributive Injustices and State-Led 
Undervelopment in Dafur 
 
One more example of distributive injustice is shown in 
a study carried out by the economist Kabaj who 
conducted a comparative analysis of the three equally 
populated Sudanese states (Northern, Kassala, and 
Western Darfur). Kabaj’s most serious finding was that 
the northern state received as much transfers as three 
times that of the Western Darfur state. He concluded 
cynically that “…the Khartoum Ministry of Finance is 
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the one responsible for the rebellion erupting in Darfur 
region in western Sudan” (Mohamed, 2007)1. 
 
Aside from the ‘unequal’ relations between Darfur and 
Khartoum and, the way in which Darfur was incorporated 
into the evolving Sudanese state that serve as the historical 
foundation in the marginalisation of the region, Kabaj’s 
research results apparently unmask the modern form of 
patron—client relations that characterised Khartoum—
Darfur ties, a feature of a neopatrimonial political system. 
Without question, the marginalisation of the region 
continued unabated after Sudan’s independence, thereby 
furthering the dominant position of the riverine Arabs using 
the Sudan’s Ministry of Finance as a tool of economic 
repression of the peripheries. The Sudan is underdeveloped; 
a disheartening situation that makes its constituent poor 
regions to depend heavily on Khartoum for development 
projects, thereby confirming Mc Laughlin’s (1962) assertion 
that in the Sudan “the government is the main developer 
through its direct activities”. In this case, Darfur presents a 
‘special scenario’ its level of underdevelopment surpasses 
those of others and has highly impoverished ‘almost all’ 
social categories in the region. Darfur’s economy is 
dominated by subsistence agriculture (i.e. traditional 
farming and traditional livestock raising), which left alone is 
insufficient for better standard of living of Darfurians, not to 
talk of developing the region. The ‘relative’ underdevelopment 
in this region compared with other regions makes Khartoum 
the main developer of Darfur with far reaching socio-political 
implications for both the region and the wider Sudanese 
state. This is because “real or imagined uneven regional 
development by the Government in Khartoum is chiefly 
responsible for the emergence of regional political 
movements, who demanded an equitable share of the 
national wealth and power (Mohamed, 2007). 
Furthermore, in my analysis of contemporary Darfur’s 
marginalisation, I rely on the works of Mohamed2 and other 
                                                
 
1See the interview with Kabaj in Sahafa Daily, 10 February 2005.  
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scholars. 1  The International Labour Office (ILO) Report 
concludes that the overall economy of the Sudan is 
agricultural 2  and characterised by dualism. The dual 
agricultural system is such that the Southern, Kordofan, and 
Darfur regions were home to the traditional agricultural 
system with no employment of machinery. On the other 
hand, the modern agricultural sector and economic 
development and service projects were concentrated in the 
Northern region. This development sidelined Darfur and the 
other two regions from reaping the fruits of growth. 
Furthermore, the marginalisation is also revealed by the 
Household Income Data of the Sudan Department of 
Statistics of 1973. The data shows the annual family income 
in the former six Sudanese regions—Khartoum, Northern, 
Central, Eastern, Kordofan, and Darfur—in the years 
1967/1968 and 1982/1983. During the first surveyed 
period, Darfur region income was the lowest while during the 
1982/1983 measured year, Darfurians’ pauperisation 
skyrocketed with Khartoum annual family income tripled 
that of Darfur’s. 
Distributive injustice and marginalisation of Darfur 
become forward ever when one peep deeply into the 
Sudanese government spending/expenditures which 
Mohamed perfectly analysed to unveil the roles of Khartoum 
in entrenching “regions’ relative development disparity”. Two 
periods (1971—1980 and 1998—2002) were chosen based on 
the availability of data and these periods are pivotal in 
Sudan’s socio-economic and political life. To start with, the 
first period coincided with the Arab—Israeli war that enabled 
the oil-producing countries in the Middle East to become 
super rich which, by extension, saw Arab petrol-dollars find 
                                                                                                                      
2Mohamed utilised the International Labour Office (ILO) Report of 1976 and Household 
Sample Survey of the Sudan Department of Statistics of 1973. The data in the Household 
Sample Survey are projection not actual counting. My reliance on these works does not 
imply that I take side with these scholars; rather it is based on their objective analyses. 
For example both the ILO Report and the Household Income Data of the Sudanse 
Department of Statistics were consulted and scrutinised and Mohamed’s analysis was 
found highly impartial.  
   
1Other works consulted include Hamad, M. Z. Mohamed (n.d). 
  
2 On Sudan’s agriculture, see generally: Haland, 1991; various chapters written by 
Elbadawi, Manger, Ladislav, Mohamed Salih, in Mohamed Salih (ed.), 1987. 
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its ways into the Sudan’s treasury from friendly Arab 
countries. This, in turn, empowered the RoS to embark on 
development projects. The second period, 1998—2002, saw 
Sudan’s as oil producing country which translates into more 
economic power. The two periods, altogether, were era of 
economic buoyancy that saw the GoS in active development 
projects and spending spree. But the question that is 
pertinent and needs scholarly attention is: how just and even 
are the developmental activities in the Sudan? In answering 
this question, Mohamed utilises three indicators of 
government spending to show regional differentials with 
distributive injustice: per capita regional share of central 
expenditure in the regions; regional share of central 
expenditure compared to regional population; and regional 
index of advantage and disadvantage, calculated as: regional 
share minus average share, divided by the average share: 
  
 Regional share [minus] Average share 
      Average share 
 
Thus, I will like Professor Mohamed to speak for himself 
here: 
By using these three measures, it is possible to 
calculate the ratios of advantage for all regions. Those 
regions with a minus sign had less than their due 
share. The data revealed that the Central region was 
most advantaged with (+0.949), followed by the North 
(+0.652), Khartoum (+0.473), and the East (+0.220). 
Darfur belongs to the minus category with (-1.064), 
along with Kordofan (-1.309). Darfur and Kordofan 
were therefore considered less developed than the 
other regions, during the period (1971—1980). For the 
second period (1998—2002), the ratio of advantage for 
the Northern region (+1.036) was the highest, followed 
by that of Kordofan (+0.317), the Eastern region 
(+0.018), the Central region (-0.162), Darfur (-0.521) 
and Khartoum (-0.7). 
 
The statistics above offer the opportunity for comparing the 
two periods in term of advantages and disadvantages to the 
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regions’ development. It becomes apparent that both the 
Eastern and Northern regions were favoured in 1971-1980 
and 1998-2002. Kordofan region, despite the fact that it was 
unfavoured in the first measured period, became well off 
during the second period. Contrastingly, the Central region 
and Khartoum had advantages in the first period, but were 
disappointed in the second period. Darfur, unfortunately, 
suffered during the two measured periods. What this implies 
is that regional share of the federal purse is highly 
asymmetrical with Darfur region, the greatest casualty of the 
entrenched inequity in the highly neopatrimonial system and 
defective federation baptized, the Sudan.  
At another level, the injustice against Darfur was also 
revealed by a group known as “The Seekers of Truth and 
Justice” that issued a book titled “The Black Book: 
Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan” in May 20001. The 
book chronicles the socio-economic and political imbalances 
between the Sudan’s Arab population and the black 
Africans. According to the Black Book, three Arab ethnic 
groups—the Shaigia, Jaaliyyin, and Dangagla (representing 
only 5% of the entire Sudan’s population)-dominate the 
country’s socio-political and economic life. Since 1956, the 
three favoured Arab ethnic groups have occupied between 
47% and 70% of ministerial positions and the presidency. 
Furthermore, the book unveils the political marginalisation 
of the peripheries, including Darfur and south Sudan. 
Although, it can be argued that there is appreciable 
improvement in the latter’s share of the country’s patrimony 
due to its (South) armed struggles by the Sudan’s People 
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) championing the 
cause of the Southerners, compared with the area like the 
West (Darfur inclusive). This is still meager when compared 
with the North’s. For instance, by 1999, the Book reveals 
that the ministerial-level appointments of the South was 
16.4%, while the share of the West, East, and Central 
regions were 0%, 1.4%, and 2% respectively. This was 
measly compared with the Northern region’s 79.5%. 
On the economic flank, it is not surprising to discover 
that Kabbaj’s findings find solace in the convictions of the 
                                                
 
1
 The Black book is available at: http//www.sudanjem.com  
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authors of Black Book where the Sudanese Ministry of 
Finance was accused of acting as an agent of, and front for, 
northern acquisitiveness. The Book argues that “only 5% of 
its (Ministry of Finance) staff comes from outside of the 
northern region. Hiring of staff in the Ministry is primarily 
reserved for northerners. People from other regions have to 
contend with the demeaning jobs of tea-making and cleaning 
offices and toilettes…” (See also Wallis, 2004) This 
contention reveals the neopatrimonial character/vulnerable 
political system of the Sudan, where the strong leader stands 
at the top of the power pyramid and personalised the public 
sphere with the help of his cronies in patron-client relations, 
draining the national treasury, mismanaging state resources 
to the satisfaction a few at the perils of the larger Sudan. 
 
 
6    The Consequences of Prising Darfurians Out of 
Development 
 
The marginalisation of Darfur has impacted negatively 
on every facet of the region’s life. Poverty, unemployment, 
banditry, etc are now its features. The underdevelopment, 
coupled with ecological deterioration and famine have flared 
up Darfur—Khartoum tension, intra-tribal/inter-ethnic 
conflicts, and conflicts between African farmers and Arab 
pastoralists. As said earlier, the ecological deterioration in 
the region made the biting effects of marginalisation felt by 
the various identity groups thereby providing a fertile ground 
for ethnic conflicts that reached their zenith in the mid-
1980s. The drought that consumed the northern part of 
Darfur in the mid-1980s became unbearable as the 
economic activities became grounded. By early 1985, the 
drought had completely forced more than 10 million Africans 
to abandon their homelands in the desperate search for food 
and water. During this period, livestock perished in their 
thousands. Also during this period, between 70% and 80% of 
the livestock were reared from northern to southern Darfur 
died, while between 40% and 50% of those reared in 
southern Darfur died consequent on lack of water and 
pasture (de Waal, 1989). This situation induced an 
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unprecedented movement of the pastoral Arabs and livestock 
into the central and southern Darfur occupied by such 
ethnic groups as, Fur, Birgid, Daju, etc. that are farmers 
who produce the staple crop dukhun, i.e. bulrush millet and 
also has age-old practice of hakura (i.e. land tenure systems) 
among themselves to the exclusive of strangers (non-
members). This is a practice where the Sultan allocated land 
to the leaders of specified ethnic groups for the common use 
of the groups in question. Among the Fur, the practice is 
such that in each locality, the group leader/head allocated 
usufruct rights in land to the members of the diffusely 
ambilineal. Here, it is possible for strangers to be allocated 
such usufruct rights on the agreement that he will remit 
one-tenth of the produce at harvest. Many non-members had 
been allocated land on usufructuary terms, and were later 
incorporated in to the local system. But, the mass influx of 
the herders in Darfur in the second half of the 1980s became 
problematic due to the non availability of arable land to 
accommodate them and became a source of threats to the 
well established hakura system. Thus, tensions were 
completely mounted while animal thefts, cattle rustling, and 
inter-ethnic showdowns became frequent.          
Additionally, African farming ethnic groups (the Fur 
and Birgid in particular) became very uncomfortable and 
hostile to camel-riding Arab nomads from north Darfur who 
increasingly trampled their farmland as they roamed in 
search of pasture. Thus, the Fur became very apprehensive 
and tried to avoid the migrants by excluding them from their 
highly valued lands, for in their view, if they were allowed, 
there sheer number will change ethnic balance and hence 
affect the well established customary rights of the host 
groups. This contrasted sharply with the age-old practice 
where under normal circumstance, the Fur traditionally 
welcomed their guests with open hands, shared their 
resources with them. The practice that had resulted in many 
migrants to finally settle and became part of the local system 
(Haland, 1969). 
The massive migration of Arabs into the Fur areas was 
of a completely different character. For, the Arabs came to 
live permanently. To advance their interests, the Arabs 
“opted for a different concept relating to access to natural 
productive resources. They were to be seen as Sudanese 
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nationals who had inalienable and equal rights to all 
productive resources available.” The conflict continued 
throughout this period because the regional government was 
paralysed under the destructive force of political ethnicity. 
This is because government officials were divided along 
ethnic lines where each group commenced supporting the 
position of one or the other of the protagonists. The more 
problematic of the situation can be put thus: “as the ruler 
was from the Fur, the other groups played precisely on that, 
convincing themselves that they were unjustly treated 
because it was a Fur led government. They acted towards the 
Fur accordingly and incidents of armed robbery were 
occurring in the farming belt of central Darfur” (Harir, 1994). 
This volatile situation and it accompanied charged political 
atmosphere forced the Regional Governor of Darfur to leave 
the region due to the lackadaisical attitudes of Khartoum. 
With the lackadaisical attitudes of Khartoum and the 
partiality of the regional government1, the conflict became 
brutal with devastating consequences for the region as a 
whole. Public utilities were razed. The protagonists knew well 
the positions of both Khartoum and regional government, 
thereby capitalising on them to get maximum supports from 
their respective backers to sustain their struggles. In the 
Fur/Arab conflict that became an all out war, the Fur 
engaged the services of militias (known as Malishiat in 
Arabic) while the Arabs did the same by using knights to 
massacre their Fur victims, burned down their villages, while 
their orchards were completely uprooted. Also, the Fur did 
not spare Arabs’ pastures and livestock. 
The Arabs/Fur conflict apparently exposes the potency 
of both ideology and ethnicity and, by extension, race as 
instruments of warfare because, the Arabs looked up to 
Tripoli for arms and supply, and as a source of ideological 
inspiration which translates into the extension of the so-
called ‘Arab belt’ (al hizam al Arabi, Arabic) in Africa. In 
addition, the conflict took a religious dimension when it was 
                                                
  
1
 The regional government completely lost its credibility due to its partiality in the 
conflict. Since it was a Fur dominated government, the Arabs in particular rejected the 
government force as being neutral. 
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being used as Jihad to liberate the Arab world. 
Consequently, the SPLM/A served as a role model for the 
ethnic Fur and also looked up to Hissne Habre’s Chad and 
via this channel to the United States, Egypt, for arms. All 
these efforts were championed by their respective elite who 
took sides in the conflicts. The protagonists also aligned with 
major political parties at the national level as a strategy to 
further their cause within the central government to their 
own favour. 
The preceding discussion portrays the situation in 
Darfur in the 1980s through the 1990s as the Fur and the 
Arabs were at loggerhead for the control of the available 
limited productive resources. As Khartoum—Darfur tension 
mounted over the perpetual impoverishment of the latter, 
Darfur own internal conflicts, apparently, made its 
underdevelopment seemingly irreversible, a situation that 
made the region politically, economically, militarily 
vulnerable. 
 
 
7. Confronting the Issues: Darfurians’ Responses 
 
The confrontation between Khartoum and the Darfur 
region actually encouraged the emergence of regional identity 
movements that became instruments in the struggles 
against what is referred to as “internal colonisation” from the 
riverine Arabs. In the process, educated Darfurians became 
the vanguard of resistance to Khartoum domination and its 
‘imposed’ riverine Arab-led regional government in Darfur. 
Another bone of contention was the domination of the 
regional economic activities (especially trade) by the Jellaba 
traders (Northerners) using the state as instrument of 
oppression; while regional administration continued 
repression of the dissenting opinions. Darfurians became 
sidelined in their attempt to enter either civil or military 
services, a situation that refreshed Darfurians’ memories of 
the position of their beloved Sultanate that was independent 
prior Sudan’s independence 
The first response to marginalisation came in the form 
of the emergence of an underground group named, the ‘Red 
Flame’ (al-Lahib al-Ahmar, Arabic) that targeted the Jellaba 
traders. In spite of its efforts in raising the tempo of 
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resistance and created fears in the minds of the Northerners, 
the Red Flame did not last long. Its demise saw the 
emergence, in 1963, of another more powerful covert group 
named, Soony. This organisation, unlike its predecessor, 
became more aggressive in achieving its objectives. It also 
succeeded by being the rallying point for both Darfurians in 
the Armed Forces1, and civilians, while its ethnic base was 
quite diverse since it presented itself as a fighter against the 
Jellaba for the benefit of Darfurians. Soony also could not 
achieve much since it fell under the firepower of Khartoum. 
One negative after effect of this episode was that it resulted 
in the mass purge of Darfurians in the National Army and 
multiple hurdles were created with the intent of reducing the 
chances of entry of Darfurians into the military and police 
academies (Harir, 1994: 156). 
These humiliations of Darfurians lifted up their spirits; 
a determination that led to the creation of the Darfur 
Development Front (DDF) in 1964 as, not only an overt, but 
also a well organised organisation to champion the cause of 
the marginalised region in question.  Though, other such 
organisations as the Beja Congress, the General Union of the 
Nuba Mountains, were established purposely to champion 
their respective ethnic cause, but DDF stands out for two 
main reasons. First, while other organisations were 
established on a very weak/narrow ethnic base, this was not 
the case of DDF that enjoyed supports from ‘almost all’ 
ethnic groups in the region which definitely enabled it to 
command a numerical superiority/advantage. Second, the 
core of DDF leadership were intellectuals who conceived the 
idea that though, the organisation was, prima facie, 
established to champion Dafur’s interest, but saw nothing 
wrong in active participation in politics at the national level. 
Thus, Darfurian theoreticians went ahead and praticalised 
this idea under Ahmed Draige’s Chairmanship by aligning 
the organisation with Ummah political party tactically to 
furthering the region’s interests by exploiting the national 
                                                
 
1
 During this period, Darfurians were the majority in the Sudanese Armed Forces, but 
they formed the bulk of the rank and file. 
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platform already provided by the party that enjoyed the 
supports of the Ansar brotherhood in the West. The principal 
casualty of this political strategy and permutation was DDF 
itself since the organisation was, with time, consumed by the 
Ummah party. This is because rather than realising its 
original dream of championing regional interests and 
identity, Draige became the leader of the Ummah 
parliamentary opposition in 1968.  
This was the situation in Darfur when the country 
suffered a major political catastrophe occasioned by the coup 
d’etat of May 1969 in which Colonel (later Field Marshall) 
Gafar El-Nimeiri was installed as the military head of the 
RoS (Badmus, 2008; Johnson, 1991). The coup had 
significant consequences on Darfur for two mutually 
reinforcing reasons. First, the regime strove hard to weaken 
the potency of political ethnicity, tribalism, etc, by 
proscribing all political parties, ethnic/tribal and regional 
organisations, including DDF, purposely to promote national 
unity and its ‘melting pot’ philosophy, while the Sudanese 
Socialist Union (SSU) became the sole and legitimate party. 
Thus, the agitations of Darfurians came to the backburner. 
This saw the exodus of dissatisfied Darfurians in exile, while 
those in the SSU continued their struggles clandestinely. 
Second, the effects of the military regime became a double 
edge sword, for the El-Nimeiri government extended the 
famous Regional Autonomy Act, agreed during the 1972 
Addis Ababa Accord that ended the first Sudanese civil war 
where regional autonomy was granted Southern Sudan, to 
cover the whole country in 1980—a move that was welcome 
by all Darfurians. At another level, it is easy to learn that the 
joyous mood/euphoria of the people was short-lived simply 
because the Governor that was appointed by the central 
state was a non-Dafurian. Twelve months later, this 
situation saw the region, once again, erupted like a sleeping 
volcano. The intensity of the upheaval beat the imagination 
of Khartoum which made the central state to succumb to 
pressure and appointed Ahmed Draige, a Darfurian of Fur 
ethnic background, as the Governor of Darfur. Hence, 
Darfurians were relieved when the ‘internal colonisation’ 
ended.  
Thus, internal political discensus among political elite, 
ethnic bigotry, political bickering, conflicts induced by 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   Isiaka Alani Badmus, University of New England (Australia) and the 
International University of Humanities and Social Sciences (San Jose, 
Costa Rica) 
 
 
   
 
905 
 
ecological deterioration occasioned by severe drought of the 
mid-1980s, coupled with the claims and counter-claims of 
ethnic/tribal hegemony among the Arabs and ethnic Fur 
(Blacks) made Darfur the zone of death that eventually 
weakened and virtually grounded Draige’s government. 
Though, attempts were made by the region’s intellectuals to 
surmount this problem by the formation of the National 
Council for the Salvation of Darfur (NCSD), a non-political 
organisation that did its best to resolve Darfur’s internal 
problems. But, it becomes unfortunate that just like the 
DDF, NCSD went into oblivion when it was banned by the 
Revolution of National Salvation (RNS) that staged a 
successful coup on 30 June 1989. 
 
 
8.  The Post-Naivasha Sudan and the Tragic Situation 
in Darfur 
 
The 2003 rebellion grew out of frustration in Darfur at 
exclusion from state structures of power and wealth 
(ICG, 2007: 1) 
 
It is not difficult to accept the fact that Darfur was 
highly unstable throughout the 1980s. The instability was 
also compounded by its geographical misfortune since it 
shares borders with Chad and Libya; two countries that were 
foes during this period, and the internal political crisis in 
Chad (between Hissen Habre and Goukhouni Weddeye). In 
the 1980s, the Libyan strong man, Colonel Gaddafi intended 
to shift the ‘Arab belt’ (al hizam al-arabi, Arabic) downward 
into Sahelian Africa-‘the African belt’ in which the main 
target was Chad and to annex the Aouzou strip in the north 
of the oil-rich Chad. Between 1987 and 1989, Libyan money, 
arms and ammunitions, with the assistance of the Sadiq El-
Mahdi’s leadership of the Sudan, found their destinations 
among the Chadian armed rebels that opposed N’Djamena. 
In this context, Darfur became the stage post of the Chadian 
rebels and the various dissatisfied sahelian Arabs and 
Touaregs that were formed into an Islamic Legions (al-failag 
al-Islami—Arabic) to fight proxy war in Chad. Sadly, arms 
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became proliferated in Darfur with negative consequences on 
the security situations as it compounded and intensified 
Arab/Fur festering conflicts. The insecurity of the region 
continued unabated in the 1990s with Chad, Libya, and 
other interests competing for supremacy and hegemony in 
the region with the assistance of various ethnic groups.  
 The present Darfurian crisis is rooted in the signing of 
the Naivasha Peace Protocols between the GoS and the 
SPLM/A on 26 May 20041. The agreement recognised the 
protagonists (GoS and the SPLM/A), while other actors and 
regions were regarded as irrelevant, their interests and 
grievances not addressed, and other conflicts, either in the 
North or South were completely overlooked. Thus, 
Darfurians became apprehensive of the unfolding 
developments and weaknesses of the Naivasha’s, took up 
arms against Khartoum to halt the age-old marginalisation. 
A secular and aggressive group named Darfur Liberation 
front (DLF), later renamed SLM/A mounted series of armed 
attacks on government positions in Darfur and vowed to 
continue fighting until Khartoum acceded to its demands. 
The SLM/A believed that their actions would definitely 
attract world’s attention and correct the ‘erroneous’ 
impression that the peace deal with the SPLM/A is sufficient 
to resolve Sudan’s multiple ethnic, socio-economic and 
militaro-political crises. In a quick succession, another 
moderately Islamist group known as JEM took up arms 
against Khartoum. 
The two insurgent groups started attacking the 
Sudanese government forces’ positions in earnest. Although, 
Khartoum had earlier dismissed the Darfurian insurgents as 
mere bandits, and clearly one of the common Darfur’s 
perennial problems, but the military feat of the rebels 
discredited Khartoum’s claims and became a source of 
embarrassment with rebels attacking El-Fasher airport and 
destroying half a dozen military aircraft. Facing the reality of 
the deteriorating security situations in Darfur and 
impending anarchy, and threat to its own hegemony, 
Khartoum opted for courting the assistance of militias, 
drawn majorly from the nomadic peoples of Darfur that had 
                                                
 
1
 The Naivasha Protocols (in Kenya) led to the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) that ended the second Sudan’s war. 
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been at daggers-drawn position with their Darfurian 
sedentary farmers and pastoralists counterpart for years, to 
fight with scorched-earth tactics. These militias were formed 
from diverse backgrounds: there were a group of northern 
‘Arab’ camel nomads, known as the Ben Helba, and the 
mercenary former Libyan Islamic Legionnaires. The two 
groups merged to form what is now known as Janjaweed 
which Khartoum supports with arms and virtually unlimited 
freedom to do what they like. The Janjaweed militias were 
unleashed on local peasants and general civilian population. 
The involvement of countries like Chad, Eritrea, and China 
through their financial and/or military supports to one 
Darfurian group or the other has added international flavour 
to the conflict with serious tension along Sudan-Chad 
border. With Darfur’s current tragic situation and the 
sufferings of the innocent civilians, especially the vulnerable 
categories, what then can be done to save this Africa’s eye 
sore? 
 
 
9. Conclusion and the Way Forward 
 
Rescuing the situation and returning to normalcy is 
very simple and simultaneously complex. It is simple in the 
sense that we need to recognise the fact that the proximate 
causes of the conflict can be located at the domestic 
environment, but the situation becomes more complex with 
the involvement of external actors and interests especially 
the neighouring countries, China, some Arab countries, etc. 
Then the search for sustainable peace in the region has to 
begin from Darfur itself. In this context, the age-old and 
well-recognised traditional Darfur conflict reconciliation 
mechanisms will definitely resolve the intra-tribal conflicts 
but with a caveat. This has to be done with the concurrent 
socio-economic development of the region from the federal 
purse. And at the same time, Khartoum needs to jettison its 
lopsided policies in favour of the one that is inclusive of all 
ethnic nationalities in the country. I raised this caveat 
because such traditional conflict reconciliation mechanisms 
have been part and parcel of resolving Darfur conflicts but 
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have not achieved the goal of having a sustainable peace in 
the region. For, the underdevelopment that pervades Darfur 
where the competitions for limited productive resources are 
severe. Economic development of the region through 
irrigation, infrastructure development, etc will go a long way 
in resolving the conflicts permanently.  The Second aspect of 
the problem centers on the central state itself. Apparently, 
political and economic powers in the Sudan have been 
dominated by the so-called Awlad al Balad. This should not 
be so. Sudan needs a genuine federal system with equal 
representations of all interests which should translate into 
equitable distribution of the country’s resources and wealth. 
This will definitely enhance and encourage the sense of 
belonging among Darfurians. 
The complex aspect of resolving the festering conflict is 
how to stop the internationalisation of this internal conflict. 
That is how to insulate the conflict from external 
interference. The first task is for the international 
community to let both Libya and Chad realise the havoc 
their actions are causing in this region and as a deterrence 
measure sanction the recalcitrant state and any country 
supporting the belligerents as well as increasing financial 
assistance to accelerate economic development of Darfur in 
particular, and Sudan in general purposely to reverse the 
country’s seemingly irreversible decay. It is in this context 
that the African Union (AU)—United Nations (UN) peace 
mission in the country will meaningfully address this worst 
Darfurian challenge. Hence, the Sudanese state will 
definitely mirror Mazuri’s (1985) assertion that: 
 
Islam and Westernism have been part of Africa’s response to the 
imperative of looking outward to the wider world. But Africa’s own 
ancestors are waiting to ensure that Africa also remembers to 
look inward to its own past. Before a seed germinated, it must first 
decay. A mango tree grows out of a decaying seed. A new Africa1 
may be germinating in the decay of the present one—and the 
ancestors are presiding over the process (Italics, added).  
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